CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Vincenzo Vinciguerra1
Introduction
The importance of studying the Intellectual Public Domain lies in the rise in both the
importance and strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in legal and economic arena, both
internationally and nationally. In fact, in the last century intellectual property rights have steadily
expanded in subject matter, scope, breadth, and in the length of time they have been applied.
This expansion is mirrored by the decrease in the “field” of all of the “intellectual
creations”2 that were once freely accessible and are now, because the expansion, legally protected.
The concern about the encroachment upon this field of “freedom” has led scholars to look at
the other side of intellectual property rights: the public domain. IPRs and the public domain are in
fact strictly intertwined and interrelated.
On the one hand, there is the intellectual property (IP) system, which is a normative
framework wherein “intellectual endeavours” are regulated by means of creation - by the
government - of specific legal institutions (copyright, patent, trade mark, etc.). On the other hand is
the public domain that is, prima facie, the outside of the intellectual property system, and includes
the material that is free for all to use and build upon with no legal restraints.3
As in the communicating vessels, the public domain and the IP system are interdependent,
and modifications to one field affects the other. If one’s purpose is to make legally relevant the
public interest in the access of all kinds of “intellectual endeavours,” then it makes sense - from a
methodological point of view – to approach the IP system focusing attention on its flip side: the
public domain.
The purpose of this article is to understand how the public domain has been construed by the
Courts.
In the first part of the article, the different ways the public domain has been qualified and
construed by scholars are briefly sketched out- for descriptive and introductory purposes to the
analyzed cases law. There are scholars that claim that the public domain has no prescriptive or
positive meaning all together, or even that it can be harmful to social welfare. On the other hand,
there are scholars that argue that the public domain can be construed as a rule, a normative concept,
variously construed, that would bestow rights and duties. However, between these two opposite
schools of thought – that well portray and mark the edges of the spectrum of the meaning of the
public domain, as perceived today- lay variegated and authoritative schools of thought.
In light of the different ways the public domain has been qualified and characterized by
scholars, in the second part of the article, several well-known and often-quoted cases law are
analyzed. In this article, it is argued that the public domain, contrary to authoritative schools of
thought, is not construed - by Courts - as a rule that determines, in a “binary fashion”, which
behaviours “will be coerced by the public power and which behaviours will be allowed.”
It is argued – grounding claims on reading the analyzed cases law – that the public domain is
used and construed by courts as both a status of the mere negative aspects of IPRs and as an
argument (for rhetorical - strictu senso - purposes) that heralds the underlying interest of the
“public” in accessing “information”. In light of these findings, this article suggests that it is possible
to start building a theory that would render the public domain more apt to make legally relevant the
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underlying interest (in the access of “information”) if construed not as a rule, but as an
interpretative principle that “states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a
particular decision” and that, once relevant, courts would have to take into account “as a
consideration inclining in one direction [rather than] another.”

PART I: THE MANY SHAPES OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
§ 1) The New, New Intellectual Property4
The expansionist trend in the field of intellectual property finds its main justification in
technological development;5 it is purportedly reinforced by economic factors,6 the legal analysis of
law7, and neo-liberal doctrines.8
This increase in protection has been analogized with the English first enclosure movement, a
process of privatization of “free” lands with the purpose of rendering them efficient9 and, in so
doing, avoiding the (alleged inexorably) “tragedy of the commons.”10
A similar phenomenon is occurring in the field of intellectual property. Some scholars point
out that we are in the middle of a “second enclosure movement” or “the enclosure of the intangible
commons of the mind.”11 We are assisting a trend where things that were formerly thought of as
either common property or uncommodifiable, are being covered with new, or newly extended,
property rights.12 The old assumption by which “the general rule of law is that the noblest of human
production – knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas – become, after voluntary
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communication to others, free as the air to common use,”13 seems to be inverted and what was the
rule is becoming, slowly but inexorably, the exception and vice versa.14
As pointed out, in this scenario, the public domain may play an important role in off setting
this trend.

§ 2) The Appearance of the term public domain
At the outset, it must be stressed that the public domain is a relatively new concept that has
been introduced in the field of IPRs. In fact, in the USA, the term public domain was used in a
statute only in 1909 with the copyright act,15 meanwhile Courts began using the term in the field of
Intellectual property since 1890,16 in parallel, I point out, with the appearance of the term “public
domain” in the international arena. 17
As some scholar have shown, during the 18th and 19th centuries, works and inventions not
protected by copyright and patent were mainly referred to as “public property”,“common property”
or “publici juris.”18 These terms, to be sure, did not find their origin in the intellectual property
rights field. Indeed, they were borrowed from the field of real estate and public land. This article
suggests that there was an implicit intuition behind the use of the various terms, and behind each of
these terms laid a different idea of the interest protected.
In the IPRs field of law, the term “public property” was used not indiscriminately but just
for patents and copyrights whose terms of protection had expired, for material for which no patent
or copyright could be obtained, for material for which no patent or copyright had been obtained and,
only in the patent field, for patents which were invalid and for materials disclosed but not claimed.19
More generally, “common property” was used to describe matter not protected by patent or
copyright.20 What was stressed by courts was that any person was free to use “common property”
and they analogized such “common property” to elements of the natural environment, such as water
and air, which were free for all to use.21 Sometimes, courts would also use the Latin phrase “publici
juris,” to address the specific problem of insufficient novelty in a patent.22
13
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This article argues that courts used different terms according the nature of the different
problems at hand. Using different terms (i.e. public property, common property, etc.) may represent
an effort by courts to distinguish among different IPRs fields (e.g. patent as opposed to copyright),23
different aspects of a same IPR (e.g. lack of novelty as opposed to natural expiration of terms
protection), and, above all, different interests protected (or maybe different gradations of the same
interest). For example, using the wording “public property” for the expiration of the terms of
protection may convey a meaning, tinged to the etymology of the used wording, that is different
from the sense embedded in the wording “common property”. It can be argued that “common
property” conveys a more incisive meaning than does “public property”. The latter evokes –
differently from the former - the idea of something ab origine and for jus naturalis “inviolable” (by
private rights). It seems that - until the appearance of the scene of the public domain – that many
different terms were used, as many different (perceived) interests were to be addressed.
However, in the 1890 Singer case, the Supreme Court used the terms common property,
public property, and publici juris interchangeably, and also added two more: “the domain of things
public” and “the public domain”.24 Primarily, the introduction of the term public domain in the
Singer case seems to be a matter of argumentation.25 The court seemed to search for a ground precisely an argument – on which to base its case,26 and relied heavily on foreign cases, and English
and French jurisprudence and treaties, where the term “domaine public” was long since used and
well established.27
Furthermore, the court’s use of one term – the public domain – that replaced all previous
terms, may represent the acknowledgment of one indivisible public interest (in accessing
“information”), that becomes legally relevant when the problem - regarding the relationship and the
boundaries between what is controlled by an IRP holder and what is not – is posed.
3) Old ideas of Public Domain and the Call for a New View
Turning now to address specifically the concept of public domain, it must be recognized
that, besides the basic “negative” definition according to which the public domain consists of what
is not covered by IPRs, no agreed upon definition of the public domain exists.28
The public domain has long since been defined as the opposite of intellectual property
rights. “Public domain in the fields of literature, drama, music and art is the other side of the coin of
copyright. It is best defined in negative terms. It lacks the private property element granted under
copyright in that there is no legal right to exclude others from enjoying it and is <<free as the air to
common use.>>”29 Other scholars have gone further, claiming that the public domain is even
harmful to social welfare, and arguing that “information goods”, once entered into the public
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domain, are typically relegated to oblivion,30 or that the public domain simply represents nothing
more than a repository for what is left over after positive property rights have been taken into
account.31
30
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This assumption has been criticized, and an increasing number of scholars have been
working to construct the public domain in a way that would confer to it a meaning that would go
beyond what can be qualified as merely the negative aspect of IPRs. To react against the
overwhelming expansion of IPRs, the concept of public domain has been used as a legal tool that
would offset, in the intention of its advocates, the IPRs expansion. Scholars have developed theories
to provide for a public domain that would be capable of having a positive definition, be variously
qualified and capable of bestowing rights to the public at large. In other words, the public domain
would not be the mere opposite of IPRs.
However, until the 1980s, little attention was paid to the public domain. Instead, attention
was focused on problems, such as the scope and breadth of the subject matter, and the extension of
the term of expiration, thereby underestimating the deep relations between IPRs and the public
domain.
Professor David Lange, in the late 1970’s, was one of the first authoritative scholars to raise
the issue of the public domain as a subject matter that deserved treatment on its own terms.32 His
insight was an early call upon scholars and judges for a new approach to IPRs33; a call to take into
account that each increase in protection raises the costs of, and reduces access to, the raw material
from which one may build upon; a call to recognize that “information products” (as well as, more
32
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when IPRs were determined not to apply. [By way of contrast], I identified the public domain as an affirmative concept
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of April 2005. To explain his idea he used an analogy about the African savannah: “Imagine an African veldt” he
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to argue that gazelles are to be understood as no more then whatever is left over after their adversaries have finished
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against their natural enemies.” See David Lange “Reimagining the Public Domain,” 66 law & Contemp. Probs,
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dignity and capable of an affirmative claim. He points out the existence of a deep link, in the copyright arena, between
the ongoing expansion of IPRs and the shrinking of the public domain.
David Lange, when in the late 1970s began thinking about the public domain “was not interested in theory.” Instead, he
says, “I really wanted primarily to encourage people to take the idea of the public domain seriously and in practical I
wanted the people – congress actually – to accept as a kind of guiding principle that no new protection would be
recognized unless, first, people that wanted the protection explain why they need it and how it would affect the rights of
others.” Id. Interview. From his first attempt to imagine an affirmative concept of public domain, Lange recognizes that
it has been an evolution in this field and that there are scholars that think that there are many public domains but for him
“one does not make more sense that another.”
Another important thing in the understanding of the public domain, Prof Lange points out is “to decide what yourself
want to adopt as your approach to the public domain (since European may think to the public domain in a very different
way from American’s.)” To be sure, he advises, “the public domain is not necessarily the same for an Italian as for an
American.” Id Interview. To be sure, my approach takes into account the legal principles that stem form the US legal
system but it must be pointed out that I am an European, and more specifically, an Italian, who carries all his cultural
and language understanding. Thus, any “objectiveness” of the approach will not be possible. And my approach will be
inevitably tainted with my own set of believes and values.
33
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Brown, “Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?”, 64 Colum.L.Rev. 1216 (1964); and Brown, “Eligibility for
Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards”, 70 Minn.L.Rev. 579 (1985).
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generally, all human knowledge) are made up of fragments of other information products34and that,
in the end, we all "stand on the shoulders of giants.”35 Lange’s was a call that, if not strongly heard
by courts, was promptly and widely answered by many scholars.

§ 4) Public Domain as a Rhetorical Trope
In the effort to give it a positive definition and meaning, the public domain has been
variously construed or “shaped” as a fictio juris,36 as freedom to access information,37 as a remedy
for monopolistic control of information,38 as a cultural landscape,39 as a standard,40 and as a sensory
stimuli.41 Furthermore, Yochai Benkler pointed out the first amendment dimension of the public
34
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a cost, it is a neutrally imposed, or equally imposed cost.” In other words, the public domain is a resources that can be
protected by a liability rule rather than a property rule. See also: Jerome J. Reichman “Of Green Tulips and Legal
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation,” 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1743, 1747-53 (2000); Larry Lessig, “The
Architecture of Innovation,” 51 Duke L. J. 1783, 1788 (2002)
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(winter/spring 2003). James Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?” 47 Duke L.J.
87 (1997).
39
In her article she (substantially) advances two claims: artistic culture is an intrinsic good worth privileging and,
artistic culture is most usefully understood not as a set of products (“cultural goods”), but rather as a relational network
of actors, resources, and creative practices. She argues that this network develops in ways that are path-dependent,
cumulative, recursive, and collaborative. An interesting point is that, according to Choen, a crucial ingredient in the
development of artistic culture is the practical, uncontrolled accessibility of any elements within the network to other
elements. She understands the public domain as a “policy construct” intended to foster the development of artistic
culture. Therefore, she claims, a theory of the public domain makes sense when measured against the ways creative
practices work. But see Julie E. Choen supra fn. 18.
40
According to Schaffner, “[t]he public domain represents a standard40 against which congress evaluates added value.”
In the patent field of law, the invention in the public domain becomes a standard, that is the “concrete example, a
specification” against which the choice to grant protection must be evaluated. But see: Joan E. Schaffner, “Patent
Preemption Unlocked”, Wis. L. Rev. 1081, (1995).
41
After reviewing the purposes and economical meanings of the protection granted to IPRs, Oddi concludes that there is
a strong theme running through intellectual property law that recognizes the importance of the disclosure of intellectual
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domain,42 Wendy Gordon offered a jusnaturalistic insight of it43, and Pamela Samuelson “mapped”
it.44
Sometimes, however, the attempt to instantiate an affirmative defence of the public domain
can increase the risk that the public domain will “appear amorphous and vague, with little more of
substance in it than is invested in patriotic or religious slogans on paper currency.”45 To be sure,
every way in which a work lays in or enters the public domain bears some problem that cannot be
resolved with the aid of the concept of the public domain as it is construed by the majority of
scholars. For instance, if a work enters the public domain because the term of protection expires,
one problem is whether it is possible to extend the term of protection; if an intellectual endeavour is
or is not covered by IPRs, a problem could be whether it is possible to (further) enlarge the scope of
protection; and, in the affirmative, by means of which guidance? And so on and so forth.
Frequently, crafting the public domain one way or another does not solve any of these problems.46
However, all of these attempts to fashion a theory of public domain share a rhetorical
significance. Rhetoric is a powerful tool that is used to persuade when one cannot “convince”
because it would be impossible to “geometrically” demonstrate, in a mathematical fashion, a
particular outcome in a regulatory framework.47 As Mark Rose admonishes: “at the present
moment, as we attempt to argue for the value of the public domain, we need to understand that we
are fashioning a rhetoric as well as a politics of the public domain.”48 According to Rose, “rhetoric
is crucial” but, I would argue, it is not enough. Fashion as a policy does not necessary mean fashion
as a “private right.” It is definitely important to make the public domain visible in the social and

creations for their value as stimuli for further creation (and “without the quo of disclosure, the quid of protection is
undermined.”) He reviews the neurobiological and psychological mechanisms by which human beings think and
perceive external stimuli. He argues that those stimuli, represented by things in the external world and perceived by the
senses of humans, trigger the “creative process” that lead, in turn, to new and original mental conceptions and ideas.
Oddi argues that all of these stimuli lie in the public domain. But see: A. Samuel Oddi, “The Tragicomedy of the Public
Domain in Intellectual Property Law,” at 8, 25 Hasting Comm.& Ent. L. J. 1. (Fall 2002).
42
Yockai Benkler takes into account the influence of the copyright system on the US First Amendment and he wants to
assert that the public domain is not a “subsidy to users” but is a constitutional required element of U.S. information law.
See Yochai Benkler, “Free As The Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints On Enclosure Of The Public
Domain”, 74 N.Y.U L. Rev. 354, (1999); Yochai Benkler, “Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information”, 52 Duke L.J. 1245 (2003); Yochai Benkler, “Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional
Foundations of the Public Domain”, Law and Contemporary Problems (Winter/Spring 2003).
43
Wendy Gordon supplies a good exegesis of the natural law theories of John Locke to explain the significance of a
rich public domain in intellectual property as so to protect a free speech interest. The main point - that could give a
specific meaning to the concept of public domain - is that, according to Gordon’s interpretation of Locke’s theory,
when the private and public domain clash, the latter must prevail. But see: Wendy J. Gordon, “A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,” 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1556-57
(1993).
44
Pamela Samuelson proposes to “map” the public domain and defines it as “a sphere in which contents are free from
intellectual property rights” even though, she adds, there is a “murky terrain” near the boundaries consisting of some
intellectual creation that Courts have treated as in the public domain for some purposes, but not for all purposes. Cfr.
Pamela Samuelson, “Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities”, at 147, 66, Law and
Contemporary Problems, (winter/spring 2003); Pamela Samuelson, “Digital information, digital network, and the public
domain”, at 80, 68 J.L. & Contemp. Probs. (Autumn 2002).
45
See David Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, 44 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147, 177 (1981) supra fn 32.
46
See Edwuard Samuels supra fn 31 and accompanying text.
47
See Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, “The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on argumentation,” Introduction,
University of Notre Dame Press, (1969). To convince means "to overcome in argument," from Latin convincere "to
overcome decisively," from com- intensive prefix + vincere "to conquer". Whereas, to persuade is the action of
inducing (someone) to believe (something). Above all in the legal field, we cannot “conquer” (“to put down by force)
with logic - as in mathematics – the assent of the interlocutor. However, we can induce (from Latin inducere "lead into,
persuade,") the interlocutor – by means of arguments – to take into account our point. See Online Etymology
Dictionary, available at http://www.etymonline.com/ (last visited August 8th 2006).
48
See Mark Rose, “Nine-Tenth Of The Law: The English Copyright Debates And The Rhetoric Of Public Domain”, at
87, supra fn. 17.
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cultural landscape. But, it is also important to develop an affirmative discourse that will make it a
positive legal argument, grounded on the living law of courts.

§ 5) Public Domain as a Specific Limit to the Power of Government
Attempts to construe the public domain as a positive rule of law have been made by many
scholars. Among the more revealing, Edward Lee49 claims that “the public domain [embodies] the
affirmative rights of the public to the unrestricted access and use of public domain material.”50
Beside the tautology,51 according to Lee, these rights were embodied in the (twin) concepts of
publici juris (“of public rights”) and public ownership (or public property), both of which
eventually merged into the general term of the public domain, meaning the domain of things
belonging to the public. And under this conception, the public domain embodies more than what is
left unprotected by intellectual property law. Indeed, “it demarcates constitutional limits on the
government’s power to grant IP rights in terms of both their duration and their subject matter.”52
According to the author, “the government cannot grant exclusive right over something that is public
property and free for all to enjoy.”53 Hence, the public domain imposes limits on the government’s
ability to restrict the free flow of information, ideas or materials.54
Diane L. Zimmerman gives to the public domain the same affirmative meaning as Lee:55
public domain as a source of rights, and, in particular, a right not to be excluded (from the
enjoyment of whatever is “publicly accessible.”) For Zimmerman, “the default rule seems to be that
once factual or other content is in the commons,56 further restraints on its use cannot be imposed.”57
It is the public domain that imposes that what goes into it must stay there.58
According Malla Pollack, the copyright clause, relying on the work by W. Gordon,59
invokes “the public domain as a Lockean common: a domain from which each individual has the
right not to be excluded.”60 She claims that Congress is empowered by the Constitution to create
individual ownership in intellectual property “only to the extent that such privatization respects the
public’s constitutional right to the public domain”61 because “the public domain is ‘owned’ in
inalienable, indivisible commons by the public, not the federal government.”62 In this way the
public domain represents, as Lee and Zimmerman argue, a limit to the actions of the government
and congress. The limit at hand finds expression in preventing both courts and congress from
having power “to withdraw the public domain’s boundaries in pursuit of some now-current
economic theory.”63
49

See Edward Lee, “The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Lgal Restraints on the Government’s Power to Control
Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property,” 55 Hasting L. J. 91, (2003).
50
Id. at 102.
51
The public domain is a right to something… in the public domain?
52
See Lee supra n. 49 at 102.
53
Id. at 118.
54
Id. at 116.
55
See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain,” 73
Fordham L. Rev. 297. The author explores the first amendment doctrine to sustain her claims.
56
Here, “commons” has the same meaning of public domain.
57
See Zimmerman supra n. 55 at 356.
58
Id. at 372.
59
See supra fn 43.
60
See Malla Pollack, “The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not To be Excluded or The Suprem Court
Chose the Right Brekfast Cereal In Kellog V. National Biscuit Co.”, at 286, 22 Hasting Comm. & Ent. L. J. 265,
(2000).
61
Id. at 266.
62
Id. at 270. Pollack describes the public’s rights to the commons a form of ownership. I have doubt that this can be the
right definition since the kind of ownership envisioned by prof. Pollack turn out to be a right not to be excluded (quite
different to the classic bundle of right of ownership which one of the principle right is the one to exclude).
63
Id.
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However, this article claims that there is no such public domain- at least not in the cases
law. In contrast, all legal consequences that are purported to stem from the concept of public
domain come – in the analyzed cases law - from different legal basis.

PART II: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN CASELAW

In assessing the normative meaning of the public domain in light of judiciary cases law,
there are far more cases recognizing the concept of public property, publici juris, or the public
domain in the context of intellectual property rights than can possibly be discussed here. In the
selection, judgment calls have been made about the importance of the cases based primarily on 1)
court decisions using the concept of the “public domain” in adjudicating case law, 2) the depth of
the discussion about the public domain, 3) often-quoted cases law used by other authors to ground
them on an affirmative and positive meaning of the public domain.
§ 1) Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co. (May 18, 1896)
The singer case represents the first time the term “Public Domain” was used in the
Intellectual Property Rights field by the U.S. Supreme Court.64
In this case, Singer Manufacturing asserted a trademark claim for its mark “Singer” after the
patents for its sewing machine had expired.65
The Supreme Court rejected Singer’s claim because when “patents expire, every one has an
equal right to make and vend such machines. If the patentees or their assignees could assert
successfully an exclusive right to the name ‘Singer’ as a trade mark, they would practically extend
the patent indefinitely.”66
Lee, Pollack and Zimmerman, among others,67 argue that according to the Singer case it is
possible to conclude that “once something enters the public domain, it must remain there for the
public’s unrestricted use.”68
This conclusion is far reached, as it appears instead that Singer’s claim was rejected by the
court for two different reasons.
The first reason concerns the fact that “Singer” had became a generic term, that is, a term
that “only expresses the kind and quality of the machine.”69
The court expanded on this issue on the first part of the case and dealt with this point of law
as a preliminary one. The first issue the Court faced was to assess whether the name “Singer,” used
to indicate the patented invention, had assumed a generic meaning.70
The Court considered how the name was used both in connection with the sewing machine
and in advertisement, and how the name was then perceived by the public at large.71
The Court in particular found that “the word ‘Singer’ was adopted […] by The Singer
Manufacturing Company, in their dealing with the general public, as designative of their distinctive
style of machines rather than as solely indicating the origin of manufacture.”72
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See supra Part I § 2
See Merriam v. Holloway Pub’g Co., 43 F450 (1890).
66
See Pollack supra n. 60 at 189-190.
67
See supra Part I, § 6.
68
See Edward Lee supra n. 49 at 108.
69
Id. at 110.
70
See Merriam supra n. 65, at 178. For the meaning of genericness see infra.
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Id. passim at 180.
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Id. at 181.
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According to the Court, the name Singer was incapable of trademark protection because “in
consequence of the enjoyment of the monopoly by the makers, the name ‘Singer’ came to indicate,
in its primary sense, to the public, the class and type of machines made by the Singer Company […]
and thus this name constituted their generic description.”73 It “follows from the cessation of the
[patent] monopoly and the falling of the patented device into the domain of things public that along
with the public ownership of the device must also necessarily pass to the public the generic
designation of the thing which had arisen during the monopoly in consequence of the designation
having been acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly […] or expressly […]” 74
In the end, the name Singer could not be protected by a trademark because the name had
become the only word to express the kind and quality of the sewing machine.
In assessing the meaning acquired by the term “Singer,” the Court faced the following
question: “[w]here the name of a patented machine […] has become, during the monopoly flowing
from the patent, a generic description of such machine, […] has the manufacturer, on the cessation
of the monopoly, the right to prevent the making by another of a like machine […] and also the
right to prevent another form calling such machine, by the generic name attributed to them during
the monopoly[…]?” The court answered that the owner has no such rights, but not because of the
public domain.
After having ascertained that the name “Singer” was generic indeed, to corroborate its
argument, the Court went on to state75 that “it is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the
patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It follows, as a
matter of course that on the termination of the patent there passes to the public the right to make the
machine in the form in which the defendant made the machine […] It equally follows from the
cessation of the monopoly and the falling of the patented device into the domain of thing public that
along with the public ownership of the device there must also necessary pass to the public the
generic designation […]”76
That the term “Singer” became generic is the reason it could not be protected anew
(otherwise competitors and the public would lack a word to refer to that particular article) and thus
it entered the public domain. Indeed, the Court argues, quoting Cheavin v. Walker,77 that “it is
impossible to allow a man to prolong his monopoly by trying to turn a description of the article into
a trade mark. Whatever is mere description is open to all the world.”78 Arguing a contrario, was the
used name not generic (not a description) a further protection would have been allowed. Indeed, the
argument continues, “it would be extremely difficult who has been by right of some monopoly the
sole manufacturer of a new article, and has given a new name to the new article, meaning that new
article, and nothing more, to claim that name is to be attributed to his manufacture alone after his
competitors are at liberty to make the same article.”79 In other words, the qualification in terms of
(no) “genericness” of the name used to describe a patented invention is the condicio sine qua non
upon which the trademark protection can be granted.
This construction, which sees the public domain playing an ancillary role in deciding case
law, is reinforced by a careful reading of the last part of the Court’s opinion. In rebutting the
complainant’s assertion for exclusive right to the name Singer, the Court mentioned the French law,
73

Id at 1007 (emphasis added).
Id at 185. Tacitly, in the event that the owner accepts the benefits it of the monopoly; Expressly in the event, like in
the instant case, that the owner connects the name the name to the machine as to lend countenance to the resulting
dedication. It is evident that a trade mark protection could have been granted had the owner not acquiesced in the name.
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By now we do not care what is the particularly phrasing the court uses. We do not care here if the court uses the term
public juris, public property or public domain. It is a fact that court uses those terms indifferently. See supra Part II,
chapter 4, § 2.
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See Merriam supra n. 65 at 184 (emphasis added).
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making it of its own: “[t]he designation continues to belong to the patentees in every case but one,
if the name given to the product has become the only and necessary designation of the patented
article”80 Again, it is possible to imagine a case in which the name attached to the machine patented
is not the “only and necessary designation” of an invention and, thus, nothing would prevent any
further protection. Indeed the Court suggests that, had Singer Manufacturing. Co. made different
marketing uses of its name (for example, attaching the word Singer to the machine,)81 the
conclusion might have been different. The court makes explicit this point arguing that, for example,
“two elements which compose a name – that is, the surname of the individual or the firm upon the
one side and its tracing or distinctive from’ (in a trademark) - are susceptible of falling into the
public domain together or separately […] Thus one may keep the exclusive right to the use of the
name, while the reminder of the mark will belong to every one.”82 This excerpt explains that even a
name that was used to identify an invention can still be protected, by a Trade Mark, and withheld
from the public.
The second reason further protection could not be granted is that the extra protection would
have gone against the “bargain rationale”83 that underpins patents (as well as copyrights):84 the
patentee obtains a time-limited right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention.
In return, the patentee discloses her invention to the public so that, at the end of the patent term, the
public has the ability to practice the invention.85
Once the term expires, the device becomes owned by the public at large “by the
disappearance of the monopoly.”86 The public domain (or the “domain of things public” as the court
expresses itself,)87 is a legal concept that helps the court to define the new status of the invention.
The court uses the term “public domain” to indicate a new kind of control exercised (a new status
indeed) on the device: not anymore a private control – because of the patent – but a “public thing,”
no longer subject to exclusive appropriation. And this “alteration” in status is due to the rationale
underpinning the granting of the patent (the “bargain rationale”) and not to some sort of particular
meaning that the public domain is purported to have. The term publici juris,88 public ownership,89
“domain of things public,”90 or “public domain”91 are all used to indicate this new status acquired
over expiration of IPRs.
Moreover, it does not follow that once something enters the public domain, for this reason
alone, it can never be withdrawn.92 The statement by which once something enters the public
domain, it must remains public property “ever afterwards”93 seems a matter of principle. First, a
name formerly used to indicate a patented invention, upon some conditions, can enjoy a new
trademark protection (indeed, in 1964 a Federal Court stated that Singer company had recaptured
from the public domain his trade name).94 Second, the idea of a public domain as a source of
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positive rights is undermined by the fact that congress continuously withdraws works from the
public domain.95
To conclude, what serves as limit of the patent-monopoly is not the entering of the invention
into the public domain. Rather, the entering into the public domain is the consequence of the
expiration. What affects the Court’s reasoning concerning the period of protection is the bargain
theory that found its foundation in the U.S. Constitution.

§ 2) Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. (Dec. 12, 1938)
The Kellogg case96 is similar to the Singer case in that it includes a claim to trademark
protection upon an expired patent.
The National Biscuit Company was the successor in interest to Henry D. Perky who
invented this kind of breakfast. After the expiration of the patent, National Biscuit sued Kellogg
under the theory of unfair competition. National Biscuits asserted trade-mark rights in the word
“shredded wheat” and trade-dress rights in the pillow-shape of the marketed biscuit.97
The Supreme Court refused to enforce either claim.
First, the Court held that the plaintiff “has no exclusive right to the use of the term
‘Shredded Wheat’ as a trade name. For that is the generic term of the article, which it describes with
a fair degree of accuracy […]”98 The first reason upon which the Court denied protection is
because the term “is generic, [and hence] the original maker of the product acquired no exclusive
right to use it.”99 In the next part of the opinion, the Court dwelled at length on the reasons why the
term had become generic.100
The second remark of the Court, after having assessed the “genericness” of the term
“Shredded Wheat,” dealt with the public domain. The name “Shredded Wheat”, the Court went on,
“as well as the product, the process and the machinery employed in making it, has been dedicated to
the public.”101 But how did the public domain play a role in the Court’s argument? The Court did
not mean that protection was unavailable because the patented product “has been dedicated to the
public domain” per se. Yet again, the key point is that the term had become generic. Saying that a
term has become generic is to say that the term has been acquired by the public. This is so because
once the term that indicates the product is used by the public to designate that article, and that there
would be no others ways (other words) to designate it, then the term is generic. It is so because
“during the life of patents ‘shredded wheat’ was the general designation of the patented product
[that it] passes to the public upon the expiration of the patent”102 and when the product flows into
the public domain it also flows “the name by which it had become known.”103 In other words, first,
if the term had not acquired a generic meaning, it would have been protected. Also, the role played
by the public domain is limited. Again, what counts is that the ‘shredded wheat’ cannot be
protected, not because it has fallen abruptly in the public domain. There is no easy equation for the
name being in the public domain upon the patent expiration and the unavailability of further
protection. The reason for barring protection lies in the fact that “the name which was essentially
necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that has become theirs by the disappearance
of the monopoly.” Putting it differently, the public would lack the word to designate that article that
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is now in the public domain. As we have seen in Singer,104 it is possible that a name used to indicate
the patented article can enjoy protection by trademark law. The court, held just this: “[…] to
establish a trade name in the term ‘shredded wheat’ the plaintiff must show […] that the primary
significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.
This has not been done.” 105 This excerpt shows that had the plaintiff provided necessary evidence,
protection would have been available. The public’s right to the name of the former protected article
could be “beat” (pre-empted) by the concurrent law of trademark.
As far as the Biscuit’s pillow-shape is concerned, the court reasoned in the same way it did
for the name “shredded wheat.” The argument was the following: since the patent machine was
designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuit, and since the patent was taken out to cover
pillow shaped forms, then, upon the expiration of the patent, the form, as well as the name, was
dedicated to the public.106 Even here, where the “weight” of the public domain seems significant
(mandatory dedication to the public upon expiration of protection), it is not the conclusive
argument. Indeed, what makes unprotectable the pillow shape is that “[t]he evidence [was]
persuasive that this form is functional - that the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high
quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillow shape.”107 A feature is functional
when “it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the
device.”108
So, what prevented the Court from granting protection to the pillow shape of the biscuit was
the fact that the form was functional. Was the form not functional, protection would have been
granted, taking leave of the public domain.

§ 3) Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. (March 20, 2001)
In the TRAFFIX case, respondent Marketing Displays, Inc. held an expired patent for a
dual-spring design mechanism that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in adverse
wind conditions.109 The respondent claimed a trade dress on the dual spring design since its sign
stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented invention was visible at the sign
stand’s base. After the expiration of the patent, petitioner Traffix Devices, Inc. began marketing an
almost identical product and Marketing Displays sued under the Trademark Act of 1976 for, inter
alia, trade dress infringement.
The Court held in favour of the petitioner Traffix “because the plaintiff’s design is a
functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection.”110
The Court asserted that “[a]n expired utility patent has vital significance in resolving a trade
dress claim, for a utility patent is [only] strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional.”111 and this is so because “the design is not an arbitrary flourish in configuration of the
respondent’s product; it is the reason the device works.”112
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Thus, protection is barred not because there was a patent that is now expired and that yields
to a sort of “untouchable” public domain. The bar of a further protection does not come, as some
scholars claim, from the public domain. The reason protection is denied however, is that the
respondent “did not [overcome] the strong evidentiary inference of functionality based on the
disclosure of the dual-spring design in the claims of the expired patent.”113 In fact, the Court
concluded, “[a] prior patent […] has vital significance in resolving the trade dress claim […] If
trade dress protection is sought for those features, the strong evidence of functionality based on the
previous patent adds great weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional,
until proved otherwise by the part seeking trade dress protection.”114 So, as we have seen in Singer
and in Kellogg, the intellectual property protection would have continued, had the design not been
functional and, in particularly, protection would have been granted if the feature had been shown to
be merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.115 So, what bars the grant of
protection is only the “evidentiary significance” of the expired patent. Arguing a contrario, the
plaintiff could rebut that evidence and it could be demonstrated that the device is not functional and,
thus, could obtain further protection. Once the presumption has been overcome and secondary
meaning has been proved, nothing would prevent that shape, previously protected by a patent, to be
protected anew according the trade mark law regardless of the fact that the device was or was not
previously covered by a patent or another IPRs,116 or whether the devise entered the public domain.
The conclusion reached by the Court is somehow forced also by the rationale underpinning
trade mark law that, the Court said, “does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in
creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”117
Rather, the Court added, pointing to the rationale of IPRs protection that “copying is not always
discouraged or disfavoured by the laws which preserve our competitive economy.”118
The Court, apparently, avoided taking any position regarding the “question of whether the
patent clause of the constitution, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired patent from
claiming trade dress protection.”119 However, even though indirectly, the Court answered that
question. To be sure, in ruling this case, the court pointed to the principle that nothing will prevent
further protection as long as requirements to obtain other IPRs protection are met, disrespectfully of
whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no patent at all.120 Again the public domain is
not, per se, a legal limit to a grant of a further protection.

§ 3.1) Principle of Election
Another blow to the assumption that once something enters the public domain it must
remains public property ever after,121 is delivered by the rejection of the “principle of election.”
The principle of election was a rule that was used to limit an author to only one type of
intellectual property protection.122
113
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The principle of election was rejected in “In re Yardley”123 by the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals124 in 1974.
“In Re Yardley” was about a design patent application for a watch that featured a caricature
of a famous political figure. The patent examiner turned down the application on the grounds that
Yardley had already received three copyright registrations for the watch.125 The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals reversed and stated that the principle of election was in direct conflict with the
patent, copyright and trademark statutes.126
The Court held that “the Congress has not provided that an author-inventor must elect
between securing a copyright or securing a design patent. Therefore, we conclude that it would be
contrary to the intent of Congress to hold that an author-inventor must elect between the two
available modes of securing exclusive rights.”127 In other words, the court stated that since each
statute strikes its own coverage balance, a work that qualifies for protection under more than one
statute is entitled to the protection of each.
The rejection of this principle is another element that may shed light on cases like Singer,
Kellog and Traffix.128 If, in the light of Yardley, a work can be eligible for both copyright and
patent design protection at the same time, the conclusions in the previous cases are backed up.
Protection had been negated because of the lack of some specific requirements and not because a
rule existed that would prevent a sequence of further protection. The Yardley case is clear in
rejecting this kind of rule. To claim that the public domain would discharge this function would
mean to reintroduce, at least to a certain extent, the principle of election.

§ 4) Merriam et al. v. Holloway Pub. Co. (September 26, 1890)
The Merriam case (better known as the “Webster case”) is similar to the previous cases
since here again what is sought is further protection, upon expiration of an intellectual property
right.
In the Webster case129 the court faced the problem of recognizing trademark protection to
the name “Webster’s” after the term of copyright protection on the dictionary had expired. The
owner of the expired copyright sought trade-mark protection to prevent further copies of their130
dictionary form being sold under the name “Webster’s” (the name by which the public had known
the dictionary).
The court rejected the complainant’s claim arguing that “this proceeding is an attempt to
establish the doctrine that a party who has had the copyright of a book until it has expired, may
continue that monopoly indefinitely, under the pretence that it is protected by a trade mark, or
something of that sort. I do not believe in any such doctrine, nor do my associates. When a man
takes out a copyright, for any of his writings or works, he impliedly agrees that, at the expiration of
that copyright, such writings or works shall go to the public and become public property. I may be
the first to announce that doctrine, but I announce it without any hesitations. If a man is entitled to
an extension of his copyright, he may obtain it by the mode pointed by law […]131 Copyright law
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gives an author or proprietor “a monopoly of the sale of his writings for a definite period, but the
grant of monopoly implies that, after the monopoly has expired, the public shall be entitled ever
afterwards to the unrestricted use of the book.”132 The Court added that “the contention that
complainants have any special property ‘Webster’s Dictionary’ is all non-sense, since the copyright
has expired.”133
The court pointed out that granting a trademark protection would mean extending the
monopoly that is strictly circumscribed by the law (in particularly by the Constitution). Even though
there is undoubtedly a strong defence for the value of the public domain, the Court’s reference to
the bargain theory, shows the reason it is not possible to grant any further protection, according the
same lines of argumentation pointed out in the previous cases. Furthermore, it may be possible to
claim that the Webster case (put in the context of 1890) was influenced by the principle of
election.134
In these four former cases, the problem was to draw boundaries between different
intellectual property rights. Can two IPRs protections overlap? After the expiration of an IPR – with
the “emergence” of the public domain – is it possible to grant a new form of IPR protection?
The next cases deal with the problem of what can be considered to be the subject matter of
IPRs protection. In the former cases, the arguments used by the Court are different from those used
in the cases to follow. The reader should be warned that the arguments used in one case cannot be
conflated with the arguments used in other cases, with the purpose to reach an univocal meaning of
the public domain. They must be kept conceptually separate because different is their rationale.
If in Singer and Webster, for example, a strong weight was lent to the bargain rationale, in
the following cases what is stressed by the Court is the utilitarian aspect of the patent/copyright
clause. There is a little nuisance between the two arguments, which often,135 if not pointed out, can
yield to confusion.
If what guides the government is the rationale in the US Constitution art. I, which states that
the purpose of each intellectual property policy must be based (also) on utilitarian grounds (id est.
to further human knowledge), and if to further progress and science means also an interest to as big
of a public domain as possible, it does not follow that the public domain acts as a rule asserting to
deny or bestow, according the single case, legal protection.

§ 5) William T. Graham et al. v. John Deer Company et al. (February 21, 1966)
The Graham case136 was about a patent for a new kind of plough that was held invalid
because of obviousness of subject matter.
Some authors read in this case a usage of the public domain to demarcate a constitutional
limit that indicates what subject matter or material cannot be made the subject of Congress’ grant of
exclusive right.137 This however, is a forced interpretation in an attempt to give the public domain a
meaning that it does not have.
The court held that: “[a]t the out set it must be remembered that the federal patent power
stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the
Progress of […] useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to[…] inventors the exclusive Right to
their[…] inventions.”138 The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation, the Court said.139 This
132
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qualified authority of the congress, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful
arts.’ “It was written against the backdrop of the practices – eventually curtailed by the Statute of
Monopolies – of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or business which
had long before been enjoyed by the public. The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may
not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purposes. Nor may it enlarge the
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existing
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”140
The Court went on to quote British case law and made the remark that in the UK, patents
were granted to goods that “had long before been enjoyed by the public.”141 This is exactly what the
US farmers wanted to react to. This is the crucial point: the premise the US Framers started from. In
fact, this is the key point that Court deemed “must be remembered at the out set.”142
What here seems to influence the power of Congress is the patent/copyright clause, the
“promotion of progress and useful arts” therein. The public domain per se, it is not a limit.
In the end, the Court enlarged on the patent’s rationale and, among others, quoted Thomas
Jefferson: “ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe […] Inventions […]
cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”143 Thus the reason a patent, a limited monopoly, is
granted is because “society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from [inventions], as
an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility.”144 And the reason the patent
must not be granted to inventions which had long before been enjoyed by the public, is not because
of the public domain, but, rather, because “only inventions and discoveries which further human
knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private
monopoly.”145 Inventions neither new nor useful, therefore, do not “further human knowledge.” The
answer to why an invention must be novel is: to promote progress. Holding something back from
what is publicly available (i.e. is in the public domain) means not fostering progress but actually
discouraging it. Indeed “innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
‘promote the Progress of… useful Arts.’”146 To impede the flow into the public domain would mean
not “to add” but only to remove something from “the sum of the useful knowledge.” This explains
why part of the criteria the patent must meet is “novelty” and “non-obviousness.” Non-obviousness
requires that the difference between the invention and what is publicly available be significant
enough such that it would have not been “obvious” at “one skilled in the art.”147 This criteria further
promotes the requirement that the invention add value to society by heightening the standard for
added value; obviousness (together with the other requirements) define sufficient added value to
justify granting property rights to an inventor.148
If the assumption is that progress is guaranteed by the spread of knowledge and the diffusion
of innovation, it does not follow that impeding - tout court - something “pouring” into the public
domain stifles progress. The granting of patent and copyright does just this. What stifles progress,
in this instance, is not the grant of protection tout court but is the granting of protection in
something that was already publicly known. 149
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In this respect the public domain is used (as it was used in the previous cases) as a status and
nothing more: what was characterized by the quality of being publicly available.
The Court is not concerned about what is now in the public domain because it was once
protected. The court is trying to fix the boundaries of the patent subject matter (boundaries between
public and private ownership) and the Court achieves this purpose by pointing to the public domain
but, in the end, resting its conclusion on the “functional theory.” In this case, that theory is the
herald and the bearer of public interest, and it absorbs and encompasses the values represented by
the evocation of the public domain.150

§ 6) Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Comapny, Inc (March 27,
1991)
Feist Publications151 discusses the originality of databases and represents an analogy of
Graham in the copyright field.
The issue in Feist was whether a copyright could be granted to a telephone directory on the
basis that the compiler of the directory had “labored” to collect the data. The Court rejected this
“sweat of the brow” theory.152
Feist Publication Co. is a publishing company that specializes in telephone directories. In an
attempt to enlarge its business, Feist began working on a database of telephone numbers. In creating
this database, Feist copied a substantial part of the white-pages directory from its competitor Rural
Telephone Service, who sued.
The Supreme Court rejected the claim because it found that the compilation allegedly
infringed lacked originality in its selection and arrangement of facts therein. The attention of the
Court was drawn on the concept of “originality.”153 Originality means that a work must be
independently created by the author (not copied) and must possess a minimal degree of creativity in
order to qualify for copyright.154
The idea that public domain helps to define, in copyright law, what is not original and
therefore not copyrightable155 is fascinating and may hold water,156 but there is a difference in
saying that the public domain helps to define originality with the idea that it bestows rights and
duties. I cannot agree with authors that as an apology of the public domain, rely heavily on the fact
that the Court stated that materials in the public domain “are, by definition, not original and [thus]
beyond the scope of copyright.”157 To be sure, this is true, but only to a certain extent. Indeed, it is
possible to claim a copyright in a work already in the public domain. It is possible, indeed, to
rightfully claim a copyright in a work identical to a work already in the public domain, when some
requirements are met. As we already pointed out “originality” does not require a “novel” creation as
patent law does for inventions.158 This concept is clarified by the Court: “if […] a man who had
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never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author’, and
if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.”159
Here, the public domain does not prevent the protection of the newly created “Keats’s Ode.”
So, also in this instance, it is not a limit to copyright protection.
Also in compilations of facts it is possible (to a certain extent) to withdraw something from
the public domain. A compilation is defined as a “work formed by the collection and assembling of
pre-existent material or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged, in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”160 In that way what belongs
to the public again becomes appropriable. Indeed, this is one of the reasons WIPO161 is reluctant to
collect in compilation the various kind of “traditional knowledge”.162 Even if the protection in a
compilation is “thin,”163 it is protection nonetheless: “the compilation author can claim
originality[…] in the way the facts are presented.”164 To that extent, law dictates that the main focus
should be on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit
protection. It is irrelevant if the material used for the compilation is or is not in the public
domain.165 If the facts in the public domain arranged in a compilation meet the requirement set out
by law, those facts, even in that limited extent, lose the status of public domain. So: a compilation
(among other examples) is either an exception to the ban on withdrawing material from the public
domain, or might be another argument to sustain that such a rule does not exist.
In the end, in Feist, the Court referred to the public domain as merely a status: “on what
basis may one claim a copyright in [compilation]? Common sense tells us that 100 un-copyrightable
do not magically change their status when gathered together in one place.”166 And also:
“copyright[…] has no effect one way or another on the copyright or public domain status of the preexistent material.”167 When the Court refers to the term “status,” it refers to the legal condition of
non -copyrightability, that is, the “condition” of the facts lacking legal protection. In this case what
prevents the copyrightability is that the complainant’s compilation was not original in the selection
and arrangement of the facts. No one may claim originality as to the facts, and “this is [so] because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.”168 Thus originality is one limit of copyright.
And even if we concede that the public domain may help to define the concept of “originality,” it is
far reaching to claim that the public domain acts like a legal rule.

§ 7) Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation et al. (June,
2003)
In 1948 General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a book about the Allied campaign in Europe
during World War II, which was purchased and published, under the title “Crusade in Europe,” by
Doubleday Publishing.169
The publisher copyrighted the book and sold the exclusive television rights to the Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corporation who, in turn, hired Time, Inc. to create the corresponding television
series, “Crusade in Europe”, first broadcasted in 1949.
159
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In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book’s copyright while Fox failed to renew its television series’
copyright, allowing the series to enter the public domain in 1977. Fox, then, in 1988, repurchased
the television rights to Crusade in Europe and the exclusive right to distribute the television series
on videotape.170
In 1995, the Dastar Corporation copied Fox’s videotape (which was by then in the public
domain), edited it into a new videotape series and marketed it by the name of “World War II:
Campaigns in Europe.”
Respondents brought action alleging, among other things, that Dastar’s sale of “Campaigns”
was conducted without proper credit to the crusade television series and that this behaviour
constituted “reverse passing off”171 in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.172
After the District Court and, in appeal, the Ninth Circuit, held Dastar responsible for
violation of the Lanham Act, for “bodily appropriation,”173 the United States Supreme Court held in
favour of Dastar upholding that the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an
uncopyrighted work.174
Respondents claimed that Dastar had made a “false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which […] is likely to
cause confusion […] as to the origin […] of [its] goods” in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.175
According to the court, what had to be decided at the onset was the meaning of the wording
“origin” of “goods” in § 43 of the Lanham Act: does “origin” refer only to the manufacturer or
producer of the physical good that is made available to the public (here the videotapes) or, instead,
does “origin” include the creator of the underlying work that Dastar copied?176
According to the court, “the most natural understanding of the ‘origin’ of ‘goods’ […] is the
producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace.”177 According to the court, the phrase
“origin of goods,” as used by the Lanham Act, is “incapable of connoting the person or entity that
originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.”178
Even though the court was well aware that physical goods are inherently and notably
different from “communicative products,”179 they held that giving special treatment to
communicative products in this context would inexorably cause the Lanham Act to conflict with the
law of copyright, which specifically addresses that subject.180
The court stated that until “an intellectual property right such patent or copyright protects an
item, it will be subject to copy”181 and pointed out that if Dastar had been deemed the “origin” of
the “goods” – as the respondent claimed – and, thus, would have been subject to a cause of action
under the Lanham Act, it “would create a species of mutant copyright law that [would] limit the
public’s federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights.”182
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In the end the Court concluded that Fox was unable to prevail on its Lanham Act claim and
thereby indirectly recapture the copyright that had already expired.183 “In sum, reading the phrase
‘origin of goods’ in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act's common-law foundations (which
were not designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws
(which were), it is concluded that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are
offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
goods. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (distinguishing between a copyrighted work and ‘any material object in
which the work is embodied.’) To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a
species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.”184
This case represents a strong defense for the value of the public domain, reaffirming that
individuals are free to use materials publicly accessible without attributing those materials to the
original source.185 The court confirmed the right to copy materials in the public domain and rejected
an encroachment over it that would contravene the “carefully crafted bargain” which the rights of a
patentee or copyright holder are expressing.186 Copyright and patent laws are the outcome of a
carefully crafted bargain and only congress can intervene to shape and adjust it.187
With this decision the court takes position against an encroachment of the public domain
that would have come through an extensive construction of a statutory law and would have
confirmed that the public domain was indispensable to future creative endeavors. The point is that
the court curtailed further extension of copyrights based on the different spheres of application of
the Lanham Act, originally intended to prevent “likelihood of confusion” and not illicit copying.188
The balance between the public domain and the copyright holder, the court held, is an equilibrium
that can be modified only by congress, within the boundaries of the copyright clause in the U.S.
Constitution.189
Again in this case the public domain is used by the court only as a status, i.e. what is not any
longer protected by copyright. It is a confirmation that the public domain per se carries no particular
legal meaning, being its breadth of existence devolved exclusively to the congress that must act,
however, in accordance with the constitution and its interpretation that it is the one (and not the
public domain) that limits the flexibility of the congress in the IPRs field.

§ 8) Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. Stiffel Company (April 6, 1964)
The question faced by the court in this case is whether State law, consistent with the federal
patent laws, can prohibit the copying of a device which is protected by neither a federal patent nor a
federal copyright. 190 The Court held that it cannot.
The respondent, Stiffel Company, secured design and mechanical patents on a “pole lamp.”
After the respondent brought the lamp on the market, the Petitioner began selling a substantially
identical lamp. Stiffel sued claiming that by copying his design the petitioner had infringed his
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patent and that, by selling copies of his lamp, Sears had caused confusion in the trade as to the
source of the lamp and thus engaged in unfair competition under Illinois law.
The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner on the grounds that the respondent’s
federal patent was invalid. Once the respondent’s patent was invalid, the court reasoned, the
defendant had the right to copy the plaintiff’s design and to sell lamps identical to those sold by the
plaintiff. A State cannot use its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article that
federal patent laws permit to be copied.
In this case, the Court held, State law gave protection to an article that was not entitled to the
protection of either a mechanical or a design patent.191 This would be “too great an encroachment
on the federal patent system to be tolerated.”192 In fact, the court reasoned, the power to grant IP
protection (concerning the copying of an item in this case) is strictly curtailed by the constitution. A
State cannot, the court says, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent to
an article which lacks the level of invention required for federal patents. Doing otherwise would run
against the policy of congress of granting patents only to true inventions and only for a limited time.
State law, then, cannot encroach upon the federal patent law when the protection given by the State
clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.193
In this case the court held that the lamp was in the public domain, absent of any federal
regulation, and therefore might be made and sold by whomever may choose to do so.194 To allow a
State to prevent the copying of an article not otherwise protected at the federal level, would “permit
the state to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the
public.”195
In this case the right to prevent copying an article clashes with the “welfare of the
community”196 that requires that the requisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed. The court
mentioned the public domain to evoke the value of the “welfare of the community” and to stress the
interest of the public to enjoy goods “publicly available.”197 But there is no prescriptive meaning
attached to the term.

§ 9) E. Eldred, et. al. v. J.D. Ashcroft (Jan 15 2003) and Luck's Music Library, Inc.
and Moviecraft, inc. v. John Ashcroft. (June 10, 2004)
In the Eldred case what is disputed is the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA) approved by the US Congress in 1998.198
The 1976 copyright act provided for a basic term of protection of the life of the author plus
50 years.199 The CTEA extended the copyright term by 20 years for both existing copyrighted
works and copyrightable works not yet created, establishing a copyright that lasts the life of the
author plus 70 years after the author’s death.
The petitioners did not challenge the CTEA’s “life-plus-70-years” time span itself.200 The
punctum dolens, rather, was the extension of the copyright term for existing copyrighted works,
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giving an additional time protection for works that were going to enter the public domain.201 The
petitioners urged that the fixed period of protection in effect when copyright is secured be the
constitutional boundary in the power of congress to further extend the term of protection and claim
violation of both the Copyright Clause and the Free-Speech Clause of the constitution.
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ claims.
As far as the violation of the free-speech clause is concerned, the Court stated that the CTEA
does not restrict free speech “for it grants the author an exclusive right only to a specific form of
expression; it does not shield any ideas or facts contained in the copyright work and allows for ‘fair
use’ even of the expression itself.”202
The Court also rejected the alleged violation of the copyright clause since nothing in the
constitutional text or history, the court said, prevents that a “limited time” may be later extended for
another “limited time.”203 Furthermore, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument for the
interpretation of “limited time” in light of the clause’s preamble statement of purpose (“To promote
the progress of science and useful arts”).204
The petitioner urged that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyright fails “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts” because it does not stimulate the creation of new works, but
merely adds value to works already created.205 The Court disagreed and put in evidence that
Congress’ legislative history reveals a constant practice of granting to authors of works with
existing copyrights the benefit of the term extension, so that all works under copyright protection
will be governed equally under the same regime.206 In other words, according to the court, congress’
consistent practice reflects “a judgment that an author that sold his work a week before should not
be placed in a worse situation than the author who sold his work the day after enactment of a
copyright extension.”207 In placing existing copyright holders in parity with future holders, equal
incentives to creators are evenly guaranteed, and for this reason the CTEA does not fail to “promote
[…] the Progress of Science.”208
Another claim was that the CTEA extension of existing copyrights without demanding
additional consideration ignores copyright’s quid pro quo, whereby congress grants the author of an
original work an exclusive right for a “limited time” in exchange for the dedication to the public
thereafter.209 The court disagreed reasoning that the bargain theory in copyright does not carry as
much weight as it carries in patent law. In fact, the court went on, in copyright, the disclosure is not
“exacted from” the copyright holder (as it is in patent law) but disclosure is exactly the desired
objective of the author seeking protection.210 Moreover, the court said, copyright gives the holder
no monopoly on any knowledge, facts, or ideas (meanwhile patent law prevents full use by others of
the inventor’s knowledge.).
In the Luck’s Music case,211 a seller of public-domain foreign music and motion pictures,
challenged the constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)212 provision,
restoring copyright protection to certain foreign works.
To restore copyright protection means to reinstate certain copyrights that have previously
fallen into the public domain.213
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The URAA implemented in the U.S. article 18 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works.214 Article 18 of the Convention provides that a member country must
apply the protections of the Convention to all works that have not yet fallen into the public domain
through the expiration of the copyright's term in its origin country. Section 514, amending 17
U.S.C. § 104A, restores copyright to foreign copyright holders whose works remain protected in
their origin country, but entered the public domain in the United States due to the (a) failure of the
foreign copyright holder to comply with U.S. copyright formalities, (b) absence of prior subjectmatter protection such as sound recordings fixed before 1972, or (c) failure of the United States to
recognize copyrights from that country.215
The plaintiffs, employing – mutatis mutandis - the same arguments used in Eldred, claimed
that section 514 exceeded the powers granted to Congress in Article I and violated the First
Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that the IP clause requires the public to have free
access to copy and use works once they have fallen into the public domain.216
The plaintiffs argued that by enacting Section 514, Congress violated the IP clause as well
as the limit imposed by the IP clause grants, because Section 514 grants retroactive copyrights to
works that are not original and, hence, does not promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
The District Court of Appeal rejected both claims.
First of all the Court stated, relying on Eldred, that past actions of congress show a clear
history of allowing retroactive copyrights, lending significant weight to the constitutionality of the
URAA.217
The plaintiffs claimed that restoration was impracticable for works already in the public
domain and they relied on the Graham case, where the court stated that “Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”218
Here the Court stated, as already stated in Eldred219 and Bonito Boats,220 that the Graham
holding is unavailable because a different “scope of protections creates noticeable differences
between patent law and copyright law doctrines.”221 According to the Court "while a copyright
confers on its owner an exclusive right to reproduce the original work, a patent provides its owner
with the far broader right to exclusive use of the novel invention or design for a time-specific
period.”222 For this reason the court affirmed that the Graham holding was inapplicable to the
present case and therefore nothing, not least the public domain per se, would forbid the restoration
of expired copyright.
In Graham, the Court based its holdings on the rigors of the patent statute's novelty
requirement; requirement that almost completely lacks in copyright. The plaintiffs' argument that a
copyright cannot remove existing knowledge from the public domain borrows from the patent’s
requirement of novelty (and not from a purported public domain-rule).223 On the other hand, as is
stated, the copyright statute has no such requirement.224 So, if the court in Luck Music envisions a
limit225 to the congress in the patent field, this limit is much thinner in copyright.226 In the copyright
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field, as is pointed out,227 requiring novelty would be practically impossible, which is why we are
compelled to rely on the troubled concept of originality.228

§ 10) Public Domain as a Rule or a Principle ?
From all of the analyzed cases emerges a concept of public domain that has been constantly
used by Courts to qualify information that is publicly accessible.229 The public domain had been
used to mean a status to indicate the “condition” that the particular abstract object at hand “holds
with reference to the [IP] rights which are recognized and maintained by law.”230 It is thus shown
that the public domain is employed to express, in negative terms, what is not protected by any form
of intellectual property.
As we have seen, the public domain – rectius, the value expressed by the public domain had also been implemented as an ancillary argument in order to assess the single case.
In light of the Courts’ construction of the public domain, and according to present
understanding of the analyzed cases law, the public domain, contrary to the prevailing schools of
thought, cannot be construed as a rule that determines, in a binary fashion,231 which behaviours will
be punished or coerced by the public power and which behaviours will be allowed.232
The rule, variously formulated and justified, by which something once in the public domain
must remain there or that a “right not to be excluded” exists, cannot be found in judiciary decisions.
On the contrary, the conclusions in the Eldred and Luck’s Music cases show that is possible to
withdraw information from the public domain on the assumption that it does not hamper the
progress of science but, rather, can even foster it. This purported rule is disproved by the practice of
congress, backed up by Courts, to restore expired copyrights. In fact, had that rule existed, the
restoration would have been deemed unconstitutional. In the Traffix case the Court stated that
further protection would have been granted, and that would have allowed a partial recapturing from
the public domain, if the respondent had overcome “the strong evidence of functionality based on
the previous patent.”233 Furthermore in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Briley234 there is another
226
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explicit dictum that is in contrast with the purported public domain-rule. In this case, even though
the Court acknowledges that under the holding in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Mfg. Co.235 the
'Singer' name had come to indicate the class and type of machines made by that company and thus
was in the public domain, however, the court stated, “the Singer Manufacturing Company has by
the constant and exclusive use of the name 'Singer' in designating sewing machines […] recaptured
from the public domain the name 'Singer' and it has come to mean not only that the manufactured
goods bearing that name are the manufactured goods of the Singer Manufacturing Company, but
that the mark 'Singer' serves as a guarantee of quality and that future purchasers of products so
marked are the products of the Singer Manufacturing Co. The name 'Singer' has thus become a valid
trademark of complainant and is entitled to protection as such.”236 The Court, after having negated
protection to the Singer name, acknowledged 60 years later that it is possible – contradicting the
public domain-rule - to withdraw a name that has previously entered the public domain.
I have pointed out that the phrasing “public domain” was borrowed from the field of real
property.237 In that field of law, every time a good is qualified as “public property,” “common
property “or “publici juris,” the qualification implies that “public interest” is involved, where the
adjective “public” indicates something that transcends private or individual interests. In fact, those
goods are not the mere objects of competing claims between private parties. A superior interest –
sometimes ordered by the constitution some times implied by common law – must be taken into
account in composing interests among private parties and between private parties and the State.238
The relevance of the “public interest” is the least common denominator in the terms “public
property,” “common property” and “publici juris”, that have eventually seeped into the omnicomprehensive term “public domain.”239
More and more scholars have been trying to instantiate an “affirmative” concept of the
public domain with the purpose of rendering that concept a herald of the “public interests.” But
what kind of public interest are they talking about? Different types of public interests exist in the
IPRs field. There is an interest, dictated by the Constitution, to foster the progress of science and
useful arts, an interest in access information, an interest against monopolies, a public interest
against “confusion” in the trademark field, and so forth. According to some scholars, all of these
different interests can find expression in the “public domain,” which is why more than one concept
of public domain has been fashioned. As many public domains can be imagined, many are the
“hopes it embodies, and the fears it tries to lay to rest.” But this assumption renders both the
interpretation of the concept troubling and its boundaries fuzzy.
However, the purpose shared by public domain advocates consists of instantiate an interest
in the access to information, in order to offset the expansion of IPRs protection. But if the baseline
policy - access to information - is shared by all, very different ways exist to implement that policy.
In the field of copyright, the public interest is best served, Courts say, by “private ends.” According
to the Court, “the two ends [public good and reward for authors] are not mutually exclusive;
copyright laws serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private
ones.”240 On the other hand, public domain advocates maintain that this “public interest” is best
served by means of the concept of public domain that, in the intention of many of them, would act
as a rule that would forbid any kind of encroachment upon the field of what is publicly accessible.
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In reviewing the Graham case, as well as in the light of the Eldred and Luck Music cases, it
is clear that in the patent field the value of the information in the public demesne, and the interest of
the public in the access of existent knowledge, is discharged not by the public domain, but it is
absorbed and manifested by the novelty and non-obviousness requirement. If the requirement by
which congress cannot remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available, is the expression of the interest of the “public,” this interest finds
manifestation and protection in the constitutional patent clause and is crystallized and made explicit
by the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.241 In the Eldred and Luck Music cases, public
domain advocates complain that the public interest in accessing information has been disregarded.
The public domain, they claim, was not taken into consideration. But the court did not ignore that
interest, and it could have not. Only the courts reasoned that the same public interest was best
served, in that instance, granting IPRs protection and thus through “private ends.” In the Kellog and
Traffix cases, the court referred to the problem of granting protection upon cessation of an IPR and
the main argument used to implement the public interest and deny protection was the genericness of
the name and the functionality of the shape.242 In the Singer and Webster cases no IPRs protection
was granted because, in doing otherwise, it would have “betrayed” the bargain theory’s rationale where the public interest represents one fundamental prong of the aforesaid “bargain.” In other
instances the public interest is served by reference to the pre-emption rule (such as in Sears) or by
means of the “balance of interest” stroked by statues and the constitution (such as in the Dastar
case). In all of these cases the public interest is implemented by means of legal arguments different
from the public domain. This point is made even clearer in another trademark case wherein the
court reasoned that to grant trademark protection to an expired design patent does not mean to “[…]
extract something from ‘the public domain,’” thus violating the purported rule that envisions the
public domain as an inviolable entity Rather, the Court reasoned, “if the public accepts
[complainant’s trade name or design] in a trade mark sense, [complainant] seeks only federal
recognition of that public interest. It is the public that it is protected [...]”243 The court did not
ignore the public domain, but only implemented the value it represents through different means.
On the other hand, it is almost universally acknowledged that the cultural process is a
complex phenomenon in which it is absolutely difficult to cut the edges between what is owned by
the IPRs holder and what is not. It is so because of the ontological abstract nature of the IPRs’
object of protection, which renders difficult any gauging or delimitation of boundaries. And if it is
difficult in this field of law to exactly delimitate what is own, it is likewise difficult to individuate
what is not owned or “owned by the public.” We rely on the troubled concept of originality to set
boundaries in copyright law, but it has been argued that the concept is highly inapt to that end; so
much of an inapt and troubled concept that it has been labelled as a “romantic vision of
authorship.”244 Even the public domain, I claim, will remain a troubled concept insofar as it is
“geometrically” delineated by means of conceptual legal categories of ownership.
But what does “public,” in the wording public domain, mean? What does it mean “owned by
the public”? Generally the pubic domain is understood as “[t]he universe of inventions and creative
works that are not protected by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to
use without charge [and capable of appropriation] by anyone without liability for infringement.245
Other sources state that “anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, and
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no one can ever own it.”246 It is striking the different formulations that, once more, show the
ambiguity and vagueness of the concept of public domain. Is what belongs to the public domain the
realm of what is appropriable by everyone? Is it, as the Romans would say, a res nullius? Or,
instead, is it a realm in which nobody has a legitimate property claim as happened in the res
communes omnia? Or does it refer to something owned and controlled by the government, like in
the res publicae?247 Probably, if we persist to implement the usual legal categories of private law,
we will always miss the point.248 Insofar as we remain in the conceptual framework of private
rights, we will have trouble qualifying the public domain. Recognition of the values and interests
underpinning the public domain comes before, ideologically, deontologically and practically, the
fashioning of a private right.249 How can it be possible to pretend to set accurate boundaries, cut
edges and isolate, by means of property rights, what belongs to and is the outcome of such a
complex phenomenon as the “cultural process”? The true problem is the relationship between the
culture, the realm of knowledge in general, and the “product” of that process. It is this relationship
that deserves the attention of scholars and that can lead to further progress in instantiating a stronger
value in the access to information. If we want to foster the interest in access to information goods
we should better re-think the way in which the usual old law categories of private rights
(irregardless of how they are employed)250 are applied to the complex phenomenon of culture and
science.251
In the end, whatever path one chooses to take in the fight against the “enclosure of the
mind,” one must confront with the empirical data that, first, the public domain is used and construed
by Courts as a status of the mere negative aspects of IPRs; and second, that even though rhetoric
matters, the sum of the very different approaches and theories contribute to an image of the public
domain as an “empty box,” capable of every form and meaning, and thus, probably, with no defined
form altogether.
However, from the analyzed cases law emerges further the idea that if the public domain
represents a status, it is also a “lens” – through which we look at the facts - that is being tainted by
the underlying interest, variously qualified and grounded, case by case. As it has been said, the
public domain is capable of many shapes, but, it cannot change its meaning every time. This would
run the risk of replicating already existing contents, or creating useless new ones. An attempt should
be made, instead, to coagulate all the different interests and values that have emerged until now,
into one strong centrifugal force (to the “enclosure”). The name could be “the public domain”. As a
proposal for further analysis, this public domain would be more apt to express the public interest in
the “access of information” – absorbing all the instances in which courts called upon a public
interest denying protection - if construed, not as a rule, but as an interpretive principle that “states a
reason [freedom in accessing “information”?] that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a
particular decision. […]”, and that “officials must take into account, if relevant, as a consideration
inclining in one direction or another.”252
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